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THE POWER OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION TO REQUIRE STOCK EXCHANGES
TO DISCIPLINE MEMBERS
DONALD J. DAWIDOFF*
N a 1971 legislative proposal,' the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission") suggested that it be given the express power to review
all disciplinary actions taken by self-regulatory organizations2 in the
securities markets. Such disciplinary actions, sanctioned by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"),' are a crucial aspect of the
regulation of transactions in securities-the paramount goal of the Act.
By means of disciplinary proceedings, the organizations charged with
regulation of the securities business police conduct by member firms and
registered representatives which is antithetical or harmful to the fair,
open and productive purchase and sale of investment securities.
Two recent incidents of exchange discipline are illustrative. In the case
of Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc.,4 a brokerage firm was censured and
fined $2,000 for what the New York Stock Exchange termed "repeated
distribution of investment literature that improperly promoted the suc-
cess of past recommendations."' 5 In the case of Charles H. Gross," the
* Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Dawidoff received
his A.B. from Harvard College, and his LL.B. from Yale Law School He was formerly
a Trial Attorney with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Dawidoff currently
practices law in New York City.
1. Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers, HR. Doc. No. 231,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Study provides in relevant part: "(T~he Commission
believes that the public interest would be better served if it had the authority to approve
or disapprove any new rule proposal or proposed amendment, to supplement or to repeal
an existing rule as well as to require amendments and supplements and the authority ...
to directly enforce the rules of the self-regulatory organizations. Such authority was pre-
viously recognized as being necessary and was included as part of the Commission's legisla-
tive program for 1941. Additionally, the Commission should be granted the authority to
review all disciplinary actions taken by self-regulatory organizations upon appeal by any
affected party or on the Commission's own motion and that this review authority should
include the power to affirm, dismiss or modify any penalties in any manner it deems neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest and to insure the fair administration of discipline
by the self-regulatory organizations." Id. at 41-42.
2. The self-regulatory organizations, which include the stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), share regulatory power over the securities
industry with the Commission.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Exchange Act].
4. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1972, at 39, col. 7.
5. Id.
6. Id., Mfar. 31, 1972, at 39, col. S.
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New York Stock Exchange censured and levied a $25,000 fine against
a former managing partner of the brokerage house of Newburger, Loeb
& Co. and barred him from association with any clearing member firm
without prior approval from the Exchange. The Exchange charged that
Gross, who was also an allied member of the Exchange, had violated an
exchange rule and a section of the Exchange Act " 'by virtue of his status
as managing partner of the firm' during a five-month period in 1970 when
the firm had 'continuously pledged customers' fully-paid-for securities as
collateral for bank loans.' "7 Rather than segregating customers' securities
-something it was unable to do because it could not properly identify
them-the firm was said to have frequently pledged such securities for
bank loans during the operational crisis that affected Wall Street in 1970
and preceeding years.'
The question to be considered is in what manner and to what extent
the Securities and Exchange Commission may itself initiate or review
such disciplinary activity on the part of the industry bodies with whose
regulation the Commission is charged. Should it possess the power to re-
view particular decisions, as the recent legislative proposal has suggested?
Should it proceed by the mediate step of requiring the initiation of such
proceedings-or should it do both? Conceding that some action on the
Commission's part is necessary for the maintenance of orderly, free
securities markets, should this end be attained by judicial interpretation
or by legislative prescription? It will here be advanced that granting the
Commission power, through legislative enactment, to require the initiation
of disciplinary proceedings on the part of the exchanges would buttress
the existing disciplinary scheme and make for speedy, direct and respon-
sible disciplinary proceedings as an adjunct to the cumbersome mechanism
of Commission review.
I. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The securities business is the bulwark of our capitalistic system.
Through the purchase and sale of securities, money is invested in the
economy and risk capital is provided to entrepreneurs. When he purchases
equity or debt in a business, the investor provides funds for the enterprise
to build plants and machinery, produce or purchase goods and services
and undertake expansion as well as maintain its position in the competitive
world.
The use of organized market places such as the stock exchanges and
over-the-counter markets encourages investment by assuring the investor
that he can buy or sell at the best price available and that he will always
7. Id.
s. Id.
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be able to redeem his investment at a fair price. Without such a promise
of liquidity, the investor would be hesitant to place his savings in the
securities markets and business would thus be deprived of a major source
of its capital. This promise of ordered liquidity was not available before
the creation of the Commission by the Exchange Act. While there had
been rumblings of discontent before the Great Depression, it was that
crisis which focused attention on the mishandling of investors' funds as
well as the wild speculation which had helped to produce economic chaos.
The securities industry had been a private club whose members scorned
the average small investor and made little or no effort to promote his
welfare. Certain crucial instances of abuse finally brought the house
tumbling down, and in the aftermath the vast scheme of regulation now
known as the Securities Acts was spawned.
There are twelve registered securities exchanges.' 0 As defined in the
Exchange Act, an exchange is "any organization, association, or group of
persons... which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities . . .
and includes the market place and the market facilities maintained by
such exchange."" Typically, an exchange is created when groups of
dealers and brokers' band together after having become habituated to
trading securities as a collective act. As the exchange becomes formalized,
it may grow in size until it is a large and powerful organization. The
general public customarily cannot purchase and sell securities on an
exchange directly, but must act through "members" or third party non-
member "brokers" who in turn act through members in effecting such
transactions.'8
9. See generally 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1166 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
by volume as Loss].
10. R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 4 n.c (3rd ed. 1972). An exchange is
generally defined as a place where business interests of a special character are brought
together, and where contracts concerning them are made. Webster's New International
Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1957).
11. Exchange Act § 3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1970).
12. A "broker" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." Id. § 3(a) (4), 1S
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4) (1970). The Act defines the term "dealer" to mean "any person en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker
or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he bu)s or sells securities
for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of
a regular business.' Id. § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1970).
13. The Exchange Act defines a "member" as "any person who is permitted either to
effect transactions on the exchange without the services of another person acting as broker, or
to make use of the facilities of an exchange for transactions thereon without payment of a
commission or fee or with the payment of a commission or fee which is less than that
charged the general public ... ." Id. § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3) (1970). A member
1973]
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The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") is an orga-
nization which regulates the over-the-counter market, that is, the market
consisting of transactions effected "otherwise than upon a national securi-
ties exchange." 14 In the over-the-counter market, sales are made at a nego-
tiated price by dealers acting as principals who buy and sell either to other
dealers or to individual investors at an undisclosed profit.10 Quotations
in the over-the-counter market are not published on a ticker and publicly
recorded, but are circulated by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc., a
private corporation. To participate in the over-the-counter market, one
does not buy a seat, but simply registers with the Commission and the
NASD, which in turn is registered with the Commission. In the case of
either the stock exchanges or the over-the-counter market, there is also
state regulation of many aspects of the securities business. Together, these
markets contribute a huge volume to the public capital formation market.1"
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by the Exchange
Act'7 and was designed to regulate the total spectrum of the securities
industry. It is composed of a five member board plus a nationwide staff
that enters all phases of the securities business: investigation, enforce-
ment, study, and the proposal of legislation. The Commission has wide
powers and a national impact. This article will be concerned with but one
aspect of Commission jurisdiction.
Under the Exchange Act, the Commission shares regulatory power
over the securities markets with the exchanges and the NASD. It was
the intent of Congress in enacting the Exchange Act to retain for the
industry some measure of control over the practices of its members.
Confronted with enormous stock exchange power and a basic unwilling-
ness to curb abuse, Congress thus made federal assistance available,
C'letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a
residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind
the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it
would never have to be used.' "18
"includes any firm transacting a business as broker or dealer of which a member is a partner,
and any partner of any such firm." Id.
14. 2 Loss 1277 n.1, quoting S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) and
H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938). The stock exchanges furnish "auction"
markets where, through concentration of buy and sell orders, the highest bid and the
lowest offer meet and members ordinarily act as brokers for a set and disclosed commission.
2 Loss 1277.
15. 2 Loss 1277.
16. See generally id. at 1277-87.
17. Exchange Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1970).
18. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963), quoting W. Douglas,
Democracy and Finance 82 (J. Allen ed. 1940).
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H. THE EXCHANGE ACT
The Securities Act of 19331' deals primarily with a system of disclosure
of the economic components of new issues of securities and provides for
their registration with the Commission. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, on the other hand, focuses on the securities industry and provides
for regulation of the exchanges themselves, of other groups in the industry
who regulate the purchase and sale of securities, and of brokers and deal-
ers in securities.
The Exchange Act places the regulation of exchanges in a specific
shared power scheme. The Act first makes it "unlawful for any broker,
dealer, or exchange, directly or indirectly, to make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of
using any facility of an exchange... to effect any transaction in a secur-
ity, or to report any such transaction" 20 unless the exchange is registered
with the Commission or is exempted from registration. The Act then
provides a careful scheme for the registration of exchanges-the source
of their regulatory powers. Registration is accomplished by the filing of a
registration statement with the Commission. If certain criteria are com-
plied with, the Commission causes the exchange to be registered with
it.2 ' Thereafter, the Commission may not suspend or withdraw the regis-
tration of the exchange except for cause. 2
The Commission prescribes the "form" of the registration statement.
Each statement must contain certain agreements, set forth certain infor-
mation and be accompanied by specified documents.2 In its registration
statement an exchange must commit itself to aid in the enforcement of
the Exchange Act. The exchange must agree "to comply, and to enforce
so far as is within its powers compliance by its members, with the provi-
sions of [the Exchange Act], and any amendment thereto and any rule
or regulation made or to be made thereunder."24 This provision sets up a
contractual basis for compliance with the whole range of Commission
regulatory directives. Secondly, the exchange must provide the Commis-
sion with information on the basis of which it can form a judgment as
to the exchange's capacity to regulate its members and customers. Thus,
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77 a-bbbb (1970).
20. Exchange Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970). Exemption occurs after exchange appli-
cation because "in the opinion of the Commission, by reason of the limited volume of trans-
actions effected on such exchange, it is not practicable and not necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors to require such registration." Id.
21. Id. § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970).
22. Id. § 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970).
23. Id. § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1970).
24. Id. § 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(1) (1970).
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the exchange must provide the Commission with "[s]uch data as to its
organization, rules of procedure, and membership, and such other infor-
mation as the Commission may by rules and regulations require as being
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."2 5
Thirdly, the exchange must furnish the Commission with its rules,"0
which constitute a second set of regulatory guidelines alongside those of
the Commission itself. These rules include the exchange's constitution,
articles of incorporation, by-laws, and other "instruments corresponding
thereto. 27 The exchange must also agree to furnish the Commission with
amendments to these categories of rules.28 The rules of the exchange
must "include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of
a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade . . ." and must "declare that the willful violation of
any provisions of [the Exchange Act] or any rule or regulation there-
under shall be considered conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade."' In addition to setting forth the core
of the exchange's disciplinary scheme, these provisions raise the distinct
possibility of discipline for conduct proscribed and policed concurrently
by the Commission and by the exchange itself. This duality is vouchsafed
by the Exchange Act which explicitly permits the exchange to enact rules
supplementing anything the Exchange Act, the Commission, or state law
might address.3 0
A further provision of the Exchange Act3 1 presents a minimum standard
against which all rules of an exchange are to be measured, and makes
it clear that an exchange is by both organization and rule to be a partner
with the Commission in the regulatory undertaking. According to that
provision: "If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying
for registration is so organized as to be able to comply with [the Act]
... and that [its rules] are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and
to protect investors . . ." it shall be registered. 2
The manner of enforcing exchange rules, after the initial registration,
is our primary concern. The Exchange Act allows the withdrawal of reg-
25. Id. § 6(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(2) (1970).
26. Id. § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (3) (1970).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 6(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(4) (1970).
29. Id. § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
30. The Exchange Act states that "Nothing... shall be construed to prevent any exchango
from adopting and enforcing any rule not inconsistent . . ." with the statute and the rules
and regulations under it and applicable State law. Id. § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970).
31. Id. § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970).
32. Id.
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istration by the Commission "upon such terms as the Commission may
deem necessary for the protection of investors. 33 There is also provision
for the Commission to cause suspension for up to one year or withdrawal
of registration if the Commission finds that the exchange "has violated
any provision of [the statute] or of the rules and regulations thereunder
or has failed to enforce, so far as is within its power, compliance there-
with by a member or by an issuer of a security registered thereon." 34
Of course, this is a very drastic remedy, since even an hour's suspension
during trading hours would be severe punishment that could disrupt op-
erations and trading in stock, presumably across the board. There are
some mediate remedies whereby the Commission itself may step in and
take punitive action either against a security, by suspending its registra-
tion,35 or suspending trading in it;"0 or against a member or officer of a
national securities exchange, by suspending his license for up to one year
or using the power to "expel" him from the exchange. This may occur if
the member or officer has violated the statute or the rules and regulations
thereunder-which may arguably include all or some exchange rules'7-
or if he "has effected any transaction for any other person who, he has
reason to believe, is violating in respect of such transaction [the Exchange
Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder."3" This provision encour-
ages exchange prosecution of offenses by individual members and officers.
Another remedy available to the Commission is the right to request an
exchange to "effect on its own behalf specified changes in its rules and
practices .... "I Such changes, it may be presumed, may be prompted
by, but not usually directed against, specific abuses by particular persons.
Some idea of the type of situation which is of statutory concern to the
Commission is rendered by the concomitant provision which allows the
Commission "by rules or regulations or by order to alter or supplement
the rules of such exchange (insofar as necessary or appropriate to effect
such changes) ...."o Once again, this is not directed towards specific
instances of abuse, but, in keeping with the tenor of the Exchange Act,
allows the Commission to oversee the general substance of exchange rules.
We arrive at this judgment by noting that the Commission's power to
discipline members and officers of exchanges is confined to situations of
violations of the Exchange Act itself or "the rules or regulations there-
33. Id. § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(f) (1970).
34. Id. § 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970).
35. Id. § 19(a)(2), 15 US.C. § 78s(a)(2) (1970).
36. Id. § 19(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(4) (1970).
37. See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
38. Exchange Act § 19(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (3) (1Q70).
39. Id. § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. 78s(b) (1970).
40. Id.
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under," reading "thereunder" as not including all exchange rules so that
the jurisdiction of the Commission is concurrent with that of the exchange
itself.41
The Commission is authorized to order changes which are "necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in
securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure fair administration
of such exchange .... ."I The list of matters which may be altered or
supplemented amounts to a catalogue of the areas of exchange regulatory
responsibility and concern.4
3
III. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE EXCHANGE ACT
Under the Exchange Act, as we have seen, there is no express grant of
authority to the Commission to require the stock exchanges to discipline
their members or for Commission review of exchange disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The Act simply provides for registration by the filing of a
registration statement which includes an agreement to comply with, and
to enforce compliance by its members with, the provisions of the Ex-
change Act and "any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder. 4
It has been held, in the context of civil suits by private persons against
other private parties for violation of exchange rules, that such rules are
not to be deemed rules "thereunder."" It is thus arguable that the Ex-
change Act is speaking here only of rules promulgated by the Commis-
sion itself and not of those exchange rules which are not expressly
commanded by the statute.
In either event, the manner by which an exchange is to enforce compli-
ance, which is left open by the Exchange Act, is presumably by discipline
41. See Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So. 2d 170 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
42. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
43. The list includes: (1) safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility of members
and adequate provision against the evasion of financial responsibility through the use of
corporate forms or special partnerships; (2) limitation or prohibition of the registration or
trading in any security within a specified period after the issuance or primary distribution
thereof; (3) the listing or removal from listing of any security; (4) hours of trading;
(5) the manner, method and place of soliciting business; (6) fictitious or numbered accounts;
(7) the time and method of making settlements, payments and deliveries and of closing
accounts; (8) the reporting of transactions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained
by or with the consent of the exchange, including the method of reporting short sales,
stopped sales, sales of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales
involving other special circumstances; (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commission,
interest, listing and other charges; (10) minimum units of trading; (11) odd-lot purchases
and sales; (12) minimum deposits on margin accounts; and (13) similar matters. Id.
44. Id. § 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(1) (1970).
45. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member:
Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1127-29 (1970).
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of its members. There is a specific statutory requirement that exchange
rules include provision for the expulsion, suspension or disciplining of
members for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade4 6 According to the statute, such conduct specifically includes willful
violations of the statute and any rule or regulation thereunder. It is the
statute's omission of other categories of exchange rules that suggests that
such other rules are not within the agreement to enforce compliance.
However, even with respect to rules proscribing conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade, the statute does not say that the Com-
mission may either review expulsion, suspension or disciplinary proceed-
ings or compel their institution. The statute merely grants the Commission
power to suspend or withdraw an exchange's registration should it fail to
enforce compliance with the statute or the rules and regulations there-
under,47 or fail to alter or supplement certain categories of exchange rules
or practices"
Short of suspension or withdrawal of registration, the statute merely
requires that a registering exchange agree to include rules which are "just
and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors"49 and which
include penalties for "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade."5 If either category is covered by the Act,
whether or not intended by its framers, compliance by members must
be enforced by the exchange under its agreement to do so. The statute
does not give the Commission the express right to seek specific perfor-
mance of the agreement or to sue for damages for breach. Presumably,
however, breach of the agreement in the sense of failing to enforce com-
pliance with the statute and the rules and regulations thereunder triggers
the suspension-or-withdrawal-of-registration mechanism.
Many matters, in addition to the mediate remedies available to the
Commission and its power to review or compel the initiation of disciplin-
ary proceedings, are unmentioned in the statute. Although the Commis-
sion itself may step in against a member or officer of an exchange who
has violated the Exchange Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, 1
it is not clear if it may do so where an exchange rule other than one
dealing with conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade is concerned. Aside from the listed areas where rules may be sup-
plemented, there is very little specification of what the exchange rules
are to contain. This may in part be a gesture of respect for exchange
46. Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
47. Id. § 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970).
48. Id. § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
49. Id. § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970).
50. Id. § 6(b), 15 US.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
51. Id. § 19(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3) (1970).
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expertise and self-determination. However, there is a similar silence as to
the mechanics of disciplinary procedure-in marked contrast to the ex-
plicitness of the Exchange Act's provisions governing national securities
associations52 where "appropriately disciplined" expressly includes "expul-
sion, suspension, fine, censure, or being suspended or barred from being as-
sociated with all members, or any other fitting penalty. .. ""a The statute
also provides for Commission review of certain disciplinary proceedings
of these associations.5" Thus, the statute's silence when addressing itself
to the stock exchanges on this issue may be interpreted as a Congressional
desire to exclude such provision in this context. While not a necessary
conclusion, the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is per-
suasive here.55
In speaking of this power of review there is further ambiguity. For
one thing, review in the broadest sense may be guaranteed by the with-
drawal or suspension power. In granting this power, the statute does not
speak of exchange rules with respect to "conduct or proceeding inconsis-
tent with just and equitable principles of trade" or of rules whose purpose
it is to insure fair dealing and protect investors,50 although it is hard to
imagine how any rule could not be included within these two categories.
In fact, where such rules are dealt with, the Act speaks only of their
existence and not of their enforcement. It is thus possible that there can
be no suspension or withdrawal with respect to violation of rules within
these categories.
Nevertheless, it is a primary canon of statutory construction to inter-
pret a statute so as to give effect to all the words and provisions therein. 7
It is arguable, therefore, that exchanges would not have been required to
provide for disciplining for "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade" or to insure fair dealing and to protect investors with-
out the expectation that the provision would be utilized. The express,
alternative remedies available under the statute would obtain only if an
52. See id. § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). Such applications primarily include the
NASD.
53. Id. § 15A(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9) (1970).
54. Id. § 15A(g), (h), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g), (h) (1970). The categories of rules for
National Securities Associations are set forth in the Exchange Act at length. See id. § 1SA(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970).
55. But see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944); Maher v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
quoting Securities and Exchange Commission v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 230 U.S. 344,
350-51 (1943).
56. See Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. 78f(b) (1970).
57. See Maher v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
following the broad interpretive view of Commission power stated in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
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exchange rule with respect to the matter would be considered a rule under
the Act and thus a basis for a Commission proceeding against the member
himself. Such action would place the Commission in the anomalous and
historically untenable position of itself enforcing the rules of a self-regu-
latory body. Another alternative is to consider the rule as one under the
Exchange Act and therefore a basis for the inappropriately severe remedy
of suspension or withdrawal of registration. Deregistration is so drastic a
remedy that it may be said to imply power in the Commission to impose
a lesser penalty when it acts on a single instance or something less than a
pattern of exchange non-enforcement. If so, a remedy consonant with
shared regulatory power and proportionate to the single instance of abuse
is the implied right to require that the exchange institute a disciplinary
proceeding. Presumably, this remedy would be enforceable at the hands
of the Commission by the threat of suspension or withdrawal of registra-
tion, or by court order.
Because of the existence of Commission self-help under the Exchange
Act, the inference that the Commission can require an exchange to insti-
tute disciplinary proceedings is less easily drawn where the single or
infrequent violations are of rules and regulations under the Act. But in
the instance of "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade" and perhaps with rules which insure fair dealing and protect
investors, the obligation to discipline must be enforceable. Moreover, ff
the violated rules were rules under the Act, the exchange's agreement to
enforce such rules would also be enforceable by an action or proceeding
on the contract, such as an action for specific performance. It would be
pointless to have an agreement with which an exchange could not be made
to comply. One court, discussing this issue, has recognized that the en-
forceability of the agreement should be left up to the discretion of the
Commission."
IV. ENFORCING EXCEANGE RULES By PRIVATE ACTION
No instance has been found in case law of an exercise of Commission
power to compel an exchange to discipline one of its members or officers,
or of direct Commission review of such a disciplinary proceeding. In-
stead, there are a series of cases dealing with individual action against
an exchange or against a particular exchange member." The posture of an
58. Butterman v. Walston & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 92,102, at 96,515-2 (N3). Ill. 1963), aff'd, 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.d 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 Fad
178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); DeRenzis v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
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individual litigant is quite different from that of the Commission, for an
individual's interest is ordinarily personal, whereas the Commission is
likely to think in terms of a broad class such as the general investing
public, when initiating an action. Individuals may also have less investi-
gative power to search out and identify instances of member abuse; the
Commission, because of its surveillance of the securities industry, is in a
better position to do so. Moreover, because of its continuing relationship
with the exchange and its deregistration power, the Commission may be
in a superior bargaining position with the exchange to bring about cor-
rective action. Surely its panoply of remedies is imposing, even though
it cannot garner money damages-the basis for private action.
The reported cases present very few instances of actions against ex-
changes by private litigants. 60 Most involve actions against persons who
have violated exchange rules, rather than derivative proceedings against
the exchanges themselves." These cases rest on an implication of civil
liability in the Exchange Act derived from its provision that district
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Act or the
rules and regulations thereunder and of all suits in equity and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the Act or the
rules and regulations thereunder. 2 The implication rests on the familiar
Kroese v. New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pettit v. American
Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Allen, Liability Under the Securities
Exchange Act for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. Law. 1493 (1970) ; Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 12 (1966);
Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange
Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120 (1970); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285 (1963).
60. See, e.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944);
Kroese v. New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pettit v. American
Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
61. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); DeRenzis v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
62. Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). The two reported state court cases
under section 6 of the Exchange Act have taken divided views on whether there was state
court jurisdiction despite section 27. In Rospigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So. 2d 170 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950), the Florida Supreme Court did not appear to be bothered by
section 27 and considered the question of whether there was a cause of action under an
exchange rule that an employee must not have an interest in a customer's account. In
rejecting the claim, it held that not every rule which an "exchange considers necessary to
insure fair dealing automatically becomes a rule under the statute, the violation of which
would amount to a transgression of that law." 46 So. 2d at 172. It is not clear whether the
court felt it was considering a state cause of action, although we probably must assume that.
Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949), had raised the question
whether the cause of action sprung from a common law tort which merely took as its stan-
dard the 1934 Act. It has been held that the fact of passage of a statute does not defeat a
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principle that breach of a statutory duty normally gives rise to a private
action on behalf of the injured person for whose benefit the statute was
created.63 The argument that a stock exchange rule is one under the Act
was not uniformly accepted in these cases, but where liability was
enforced, such a reading of the Act was acknowledged." On this basis,
it may be argued, therefore, that such a Commission right obtains under
the Act.
V. PRiVATE ACTIONS AGAINST EXCHANGES
A second group of cases is even more directly relevant to the question
of Commission power. These cases concern private actions against ex-
changes themselves, and in some instances present the direct question
whether an exchange has failed to enforce compliance by its members
with rules of the exchange. 5 In the leading case of Baird v. Franklin,,
a private citizen brought an action against the New York Stock Exchange
for damages occasioned by the Exchange's failure to take disciplinary
action against a member after there was reason to believe that the member
had converted the plaintiffs' securities. The Second Circuit broadly con-
ceded that the statutory scheme of the Exchange Act placed upon the
Exchange a duty to enforce its rules against member abuse." The majority
opinion stated that the terms of the duty were to "investigate the dealings
and the financial conditions of the members and to suspend or expel
members who it had reason to believe had been guilty of conduct incon-
sistent with just and equitable principles of trade.""8 The duty to suspend
or expel was thus grounded upon "reason to believe" rather than upon
proof by a preponderance of the evidence or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.69 The majority in Baird based its finding of an exchange duty
common law remedy in the United States. United States v. Silliman, 167 F2d 607 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948). Most recently in New York Stock Exch. v. Pickard & Co.,
282 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court declined to take jurisdiction of a counterclaim whose
gravamen was the allegation that the stock exchange, which had sought recovery of funds
advanced to pay customers of a brokerage house, had failed to enforce compliance by the
brokerage house with the 1934 Act. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), earlier
had raised, but did not decide, whether a violation of a stock exchange rule gave rise to a
cause of action under state law. See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1961).
63. See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
64. See Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock
Exchange Rules, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1120, 1127-28 (1970).
65. See cases cited note 60 supra.
66. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
67. "We accede to the view that the Stock Exchange violated a duty when it failed to
take disciplinary action against Richard Whitney on November 24, 1937, after there was
reason to believe that the latter had converted the plaintiffs' securities." 141 F.2d at 239.
68. Id.
69. The alternative of discipline, announced in the statute was curiously absent from
the court's pronouncement.
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upon the Exchange Act provision requiring rules for "expulsion, suspen-
sion, or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade."10 The duty to have rules is
a duty to enforce such rules. This, in turn, is the basis of an enforcement
right in the Commission. While this statement of the duty was implicit
in the majority opinion, the dissent expressly stated that the Exchange
Act "places a duty upon the Stock Exchange to enforce the rules and
regulations" which, by reason of the registration, had been accepted as
"just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors."
Amplifying the majority opinion in this respect, the dissent reasoned
that the passage of mere "token regulations" without the concomitant
obligation to enforce them would have rendered the statute "meaning-
less.'171 Declining to answer the question of whether or not plaintiffs
were third-party beneficiaries of the exchange-Commission agreement,
because the answer was not necessary to its conclusion, 2 the dissent found
the right of action in the Act. It parted company from the majority only
in finding that the Exchange had proximately caused damage to the
plaintiffs.
Baird has been followed in several cases and extended to include negli-
gent violations of the statute.73 However, the natural progression which
would have made the Commission the watchdog of the exchange's duty
to enforce Exchange rules has apparently not transpired. As far back as
1941, the Commission had called to Congress' attention the absence in
70. Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(b) (1970).
71. 141 F.2d at 244. "There can be no doubt that § 6(b) places a duty upon the Stock
Exchange to enforce the rules and regulations prescribed by that section. Any other con-
struction would render the provision meaningless. Defendant's argument that the Securities
Exchange Act did not alter the prior status of the Stock Exchange Rules as by-laws of a
private club is untenable. If all that § 6(b) meant was that every exchange should pass
token regulations, incapable of enforcement except at the wish of the exchange Itself, there
would have been no purpose for its inclusion in the Act. Sections 6(b) and (d) were surely
intended to be read together, and the latter makes it clear that the purpose of the require-
ments of the former is 'to insure fair dealings and to protect investors.' This can be realized
only if § 6(b) is construed as imposing the twofold duty upon an exchange of enacting
certain rules and regulations and of seeing that they are enforced.
"The Stock Exchange, therefore, was under a duty on November 24, 1937, to take dis-
cplinary action against Richard Whitney for the various violations of the Securities Ex-
change Act and the Rules of the Exchange which it either knew of or at least had
reasonable cause to suspect. Its complete inaction for some two months was a dereliction of
that duty and a violation of § 6(b) of the Act." Id. (dissenting opinion). This passage In
the dissent was considered a reflection of the opinion of the entire court. Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 373 U.S. 341
(1963).
72. 141 F.2d at 244.
73. See, e.g., Kroese v. New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Pettit recognized a cause
of action for negligent violation of section 6.
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the statute of an express or clear right to compel an exchange to enforce
its rules. Yet, rather than seek this remedy, the Commission sought
instead to have its own jurisdiction include enforcement of non-Commis-
sion exchange rules, and to have it made clear that it might suspend or
revoke an exchange's registration for failure to enforce compliance with
the exchange's rules.75 Perhaps the Commission felt that such a remedy
would bear down too drastically on its self-regulatory partner. Neverthe-
less, in light of its legislative strivings, it cannot be said that the Commis-
sion considered its inability to force compliance with non-Commission
exchange rules an insignificant matter.
The exercise of Commission jurisdiction to enforce exchange rules has
not been criticized by textwriters, who have either ignored the question"0
or have appeared to agree with the latitude suggested by Baird. 7 The
major challenge to such jurisdiction has instead come from some rather
broad language in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange .7  Silver was a civil action by a non-
member broker-dealer against the New York Stock Exchange for, inter
alia, violation of the antitrust laws through enforcement of its constitu-
tion and rules by coercing members to discontinue providing customers
with private wire connections to their offices. In reaching the conclusion
that the Exchange had violated the antitrust laws, the Court was persuaded
in part by the absence of Commission jurisdiction to review the Ex-
change's action. But the use of the word "jurisdiction" may have sug-
gested that initiation as well as review of "specific instances of abuse"
was being discussed.79 In any event, careful reading of the Silver decision
compels a contrary conclusion."0 Echoing the textwriters, the Court found
review power to be lacking. It left standing the Second Circuit dictum
that the Act "makes it a duty to enforce the rules which it is required
to file with the Commission." 8'
74. 2 Loss 1176.
75. Id.
76. See Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 Law &
Contemo. Prob. 518, 525 (1952).
77. See 2 Loss 1177-78.
78. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
79. "Although the Act gives to the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to
request exchanges to make changes in their rules . . . it does not give the Commission
jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforcement of exchange rules.... This aspect
of the statute, for one thing, obviates any need to consider whether petitioners were re-
quired to resort to the Commission for relief before coming into court." Id. at 357-58.
The obligation to resort to the Commission first and thus to exhaust administrative
remedies was rejected in Bright v. Philadelphia-Balt.-Wrash. Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495
(E.D. Pa. 1971).
80. 373 U.S. at 358.
81. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Notwithstanding this reading of Silver, at least one court has left the
status of Baird v. Franklin in some doubt by reading the Silver dictum
with respect to curbing "specific instances of abuse" to mean that the
Commission could not initiate a proceeding of some unnamed sort against
an exchange for the exchange's failure to comply with provisions of its
constitution.82 Despite this broad language, Bright v. Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange83 appears to have addressed itself
to a situation where the exchange had violated its own constitutional
provisions, rather than where it had failed to enforce its provisions against
a member.
VI. THE MEANS OF ENFORCING EXcHANGE RULES
Other alternatives are available to enforce exchange rules. In the first
place, the exchange might be left free to enforce its own rules without
Commission or judicial oversight. Certainly its expertise would make it
uniquely capable of identifying and punishing abuse. The exchange
would have a special feel for the issues involved and the magnitude of
the abuse against the pattern of dealing of the defendant in question. It
could attune its remedy to its sense of the marketplace without the pos-
sibility of Commission or judicial intrusion. The exchange could conserve
its position as a self-regulatory partner of the Commission by keeping
82. Bright v. Philadelphia-Balt.-Wash. Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495, 502-03 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
83. The Bright court wrote: "Finally, defendants argue that the Commission does not
have the power to curb specific instances of abuse with regard to the rules of the exchange,
and, therefore, it follows that the Courts also do not have such power. Section 27, however,
provides that District Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of any duty
created by the Act. It does not provide that jurisdiction is limited to those violations over
which the Commission has concurrent jurisdiction and cannot be so read. Jurisdiction of the
Commission or lack thereof has no bearing whatsoever upon jurisdiction of this Court
pursuant to Section 27.
"Thus, it is immaterial for purposes of jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Act whether
or not the Commission has the power to curb specific instances of violations of a duty created
by Section 6. Defendants, however, contend that the Commission does have such power
and, therefore, plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he never
sought relief from the Commission.
"Section 19 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s, defines the powers of the Commission with re-
spect to exchanges. The Commission is authorized to suspend or withdraw the registration
of a national securities exchange if it finds that the exchange has violated any provision of
the Act or failed to enforce compliance therewith by its members. Suspension or withdrawal
of registration is a drastic remedy available only in flagrant cases, and obviously is not an
appropriate remedy for plaintiff. Surely, it was not intended that the Act would authorize
the Commission to take such extraordinary action in a situation like that of plaintiff. The
Act did not give the Commission the power to curb specific instances of abuse. . . .Thus,
plaintiff shall not fail because he did not seek redress of his grievances from the Commis-
sion." 327 F. Supp. at 502-03.
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for itself the enforcement of rules whose adequacy the Commission had
already passed upon. On the other hand, the abuses inherent in this
private-club thinking have by now been exposed. The tendency to deal
too favorably with those inside the "club" and to give short shrift to
investors is probably too pronounced to allow the exchanges to be their
own final arbiters. In addition, the public is by now too accustomed to
the protection of its rights to allow exchanges to sweep abuses under
oriental carpets.
As a third-party beneficiary of the Commission-exchange relationship,
the investor may rest in a more comfortable position. He might be re-
quired first to exhaust his administrative remedies by seeking Commis-
sion participation in curbing a specific abuse and availing himself of
Commission fact-finding and enforcement powers. Under such a theory,
the investor would presumably be able to resort to judicial remedy should
the Commission decline to act in a particular instance of abuse. He would
not be left to make his own case on deposition against hostile parties and
the role of shared Commission-exchange power would be preserved.
Conversely, as a third-party beneficiary of the investor-exchange
relationship, the Commission would have the power to group cases of
individual abuse into a class action. Individuals would benefit from a
consolidated litigation by avoiding the difficulty and expense of separate
suits. The Commission could make use of its superior fact-finding and
adjudicative design and the exchange would look to the Commission as
a forceful body to whom it would be accountable.
Were the Commission to inspire disciplinary action itself by informal
suggestion to an exchange while holding mandamus power in reserve, pre-
sumably exchanges would be unlikely to make self-serving decisions. While
the exchange would maintain its own procedures in the actual disciplinary
hearing, the Commission could step in where it appeared that exchanges
had overlooked the abuse or failed to take appropriate action. As in any
prosecutorial action, much of the repudiation and punishment is achieved
by the identification of an abuse and the initiation of a proceeding, what-
ever may be its ultimate result. It has been noted by at least one court
that enforcing compliance with the Exchange Act and Commission rules
and regulations so far as is within the power of an exchange does not
exact an undue burden." The exchange need not "investigate and pry
into every phase of its members' activities, but on the other hand it can-
not simply sit back and take no affirmative action whatsoever in enforc-
ing compliance with the Act."8" While one may not agree with this
84. Butterman v. Walston & Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
f 92,102, at 96,515-2 (N.D. 111. 1963), atPd 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 913 (1968).
85. [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. t 92,102, at 96,515-3.
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formulation, it at least underlines the point that courts will not force
intolerable duties on the exchanges.
If initiation by identification were to begin with the Commission,
it would likely inform the exchange of the abuse and recommend or
require action. Alternatively, the Commission might, by formal action,
require discipline by the exchange, enforcing its demand either by threat
of invocation of one of its statutory remedies or, more likely, the threat
of seeking mandamus or like judicial remedy. Such a judicial remedy
presumably would be available at an initial stage or as an alternative to
an administrative ruling. Conceivably there could also be a requirement
to invoke a proceeding for violation of a Commission rule where the rule
covered the abuse in question. The alternative of engaging, threatening
or encouraging a private party to sue for violation of an exchange rule
would seem a severe restraint upon individual action, especially where
threats were employed.
Another significant consideration is whether or not the Commission
has disciplined a member. If it has acted within its powers, it is arguable
that the idea of shared responsibility makes it less important that an
exchange be compelled to initiate proceedings. On the other hand, it is
arguable as well that where the exchange and the Commission might
reach contrary results, the exchange should not be left free to support or
countenance an opposing result, thus giving the appearance of a less
than united front between the two agencies. Therefore, where exchange
action is a needed supplement to Commission action or where exchange
expertise and familiarity with the factual situation make it more likely
that the exchange would reach the desired result, it might be helpful to
"imply" Commission power under the statute to compel the exchange to
invoke its disciplinary powers. Such an implication might be more difficult
if the violation is of a Commission statute, rule or regulation. Distinctions
in this regard might also be relevant where the exchange rules are more
in the nature of housekeeping. Double jeopardy would presumably be
avoided since there would be no need to discipline twice under the Act.
However, in any case the decision as to who was to seek enforcement
first, or who was more aptly the disciplinarian, would best be decided on
the basis of suitability where, hopefully, a certain cooperative zeal would
be evident.
Were the Commission merely to review exchange disciplinary action
without compelling its initiation, the exchange would have the advantage
of being left free to identify and judge abuse by its own procedure. This
method, however, would give the Commission an opportunity to enter the
picture only where an exchange proceeding had been undertaken. It could
thus leave many violations unpunished. While the Commission is well
suited to hear such cases on review, and the public interest would thus
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be carefully looked after, without initiatory power, the mechanism would
have severe shortcomings.
VII. THE REPoRT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE CommssIoN
The above factors were certainly considered by the Commission in its
report and recommendations entitled, Study of Unsafe and Unsound
Practices of Brokers and Dealers ("Report")." It is not the object here
to examine the Report in detail, but merely to focus upon those of its
recommendations which concern disciplinary proceedings.
The basic finding of the Report was that recent back-office and related
securities market difficulties indicate that "present authority is insufficient
to insure fair and effective self-regulation in the areas of rule-making,
enforcement and disciplinary proceedings.""7 For whatever reason, it is
clear that exchange rules have not been effectively enforced. Of paramount
importance is the Commission's lack of power to enforce directly the
rules of the self-regulatory organizations against their members. This was
apparently the thrust of Bright v. Philakdelphia-Baltimore-Washington
Stock Exchange.'8 Sensing a crisis in the industry-as from increased
customer complaints-the Commission might nonetheless be incapable
of doing anything to ameliorate individual instances of abuse. The remedy
proposed herein is one avenue of redressing the situation. Legislation of
the nature recommended in the Report would grant the Commission
authority to directly enforce the rules of the self-regulatory organizations,
presumably after exchanges had been told what the Commission consid-
ered necessary and had either failed to take action or would not have
time effectively to do so.
Of broader moment is the Report's recommendation that the Commis-
sion be granted the authority to review all disciplinary actions taken by
self-regulatory organizations.89 Review would be on appeal by any affected
party or on the Commission's own motion. Review authority would include
the power to affirm, dismiss or modify any penalties in any manner the
Commission deemed necessary "in the public interest" and "to insure the
fair administration of discipline by the self-regulatory organization.200
The caveat would be imposed on the review authority, as well as on the
Commission enforcement proposal, that while the Commission's authority
over the self-regulatory organizations would be increased, "these powers
would be exercised only infrequently."'" Thus, the effect would be to
86. H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see note I supra.
87. H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1971).
88. 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see note 83 supra.
89. H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1971).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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provide additional weapons for times of crisis or grave injustice; not to
distort the balance between Commission and exchange regulatory power.
Taken at face value, the extreme degree of exchange power and jealousy
for its prerogatives as well as the limitations on Commission personnel
expansion would probably not permit the Commission to take over the
whole disciplinary process.
According to Silver v. New York Stock Exchange92 and the textwriters
cited therein,0 3 express legislative authority appears to be required for
the Commission to entertain disciplinary proceedings on review. The
express authority given the Commission to review NASD disciplinary
actions makes the failure to provide for exchange disciplinary proceed-
ings an expression of intent that the Commission should not have such
power. Nevertheless, the Commission is carefully designed to undertake
such review and to pay heed to larger public interest objectives in reach-
ing its decision. It is likely to give such disciplinary proceedings a broader
scope of review than the traditionally limited review given by courts to
such private rules, cloaked as they may be with the public interest.
Because of the public registration of exchanges as well as federal
scrutiny, issues of due process in such hearings are bound to surface.
Silver itself held that such constitutional requirements must be respected
by exchanges in enforcing their constitutions and rules.94 There is already
a strong body of procedural safeguards pressed on the Commission in
its hearing procedures,95 and the visibility of Commission actions, coupled
with ready court review, would make Commission review of exchange
disciplinary proceedings a welcomed innovation. While the Report fails
to specify whether review would be de novo or whether findings of fact
by an exchange would be accepted on review, except perhaps, where
clearly erroneous, Congress might well make such a specification. The
"clearly erroneous test" or a test of "substantial evidence on the record"
might, if enacted or judicially applied, leave exchange expertise intact and
render tolerable the burden of the Commission on review.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Report did not deal with the
Commission's power to require the exchanges to discipline their members.
Perhaps, it did not wish to prejudge a position that the Commission hopes
to assert judicially. Hopefully, the Report and its legislative progeny will
not be considered as a waiver of the judicial implication in the Exchange
Act as presently enacted. Surely this mediate remedy would be more
attuned to shared regulatory responsibility and might rest easier with
the exchanges themselves.
92. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
93. Id. at 357-58.
94. Id. at 361-66.
95. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act 5, U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970), applies to
Commission hearings.
